Executive dominance in the contemporary EU is part of a wider migration of executive power towards types of decision making that eschew electoral accountability and popular democratic control. This democratic gap is fed by fargoing secrecy arrangements and practices exercised in a concerted fashion by the various executive actors at different levels of governance and resulting in the blacking out of crucial information and documents -even for parliaments. Beyond a deconstruction exercise on the nature and location of EU executive power and secretive working practices, this article focuses on the challenges facing parliaments in particular. It seeks to reconstruct a more pro-active and networked role of parliaments -both national and European -as countervailing power. In this vision parliaments must assert themselves in a manner that is true to their role in the political system and that is not dictated by government at any level.
Introduction
Why does executive dominance matter in the context of the European Union?
One reason is the nature and reach and intensity of EU governance as it has evolved, in recent years in particular. European governance embraces the Treaty-based and other powers of the various key political actors (the European Council, the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament), in particular their role in law making and execution. The European Council sets the agenda and directs the lawmaking institutions, the Commission proposes the content of far-reaching legislation, ensures its implementation and negotiates international agreements and the Council is co-legislator, main decision-maker and executive actor depending on the policy area. European governance also covers the (considerably greater) executive power of the European Union that is exercised to a considerable extent by a host of more 'hidden' but nonetheless formal actors towards the backstage of European governance (for example, European level agencies and 'comitology' committees). 1 Agencies that provide key certification of airplanes or medicines or food and committees that decide which tracts of land to place on the environmentally protected area list are adopting decisions that are seemingly 'technical' but may also be politically salient in a host of ways. All these decisions matter, also ultimately for the European citizen, even if they only sporadically or invisibly affect him or her.
Another reason to be concerned about executive dominance is the manner in which democracy is hollowed out in the context of the EU. The phenomenon of strong executive power sidelining the institutions of representative or liberal democracy often consolidates and intensifies in times of emergency or crisis. The US security emergency had repercussions worldwide and also in Europe and continues to be felt today. 2 The fight against terrorism has spawned a variety of disputed legal acts and legislation in Europe with fundamental implications for the privacy and civil liberties of citizens and non-citizens. 3 Unilateral control over information and 1 See further, D. Curtin, H. Hofmann and J. Mendes, 'Constitutionalising EU Executive RuleMaking Procedures: A Research Agenda' (2013) 19 ELJ 1. 2 See for a long standing challenge to the blacklisting of terrorists by the EU, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C -593/10 P and C -595/10 P Case C-584/10P Commission and others v Kadi , judgment of 18 July 2013, not yet published. 3 See for example the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and authority 11 touch on very sensitive areas of national policy. Executive dominance by EU institutions and by (some) national actors at the European level has now reached into such sensitive policy fields as national budgets and macro-economic decisions (for example with regard to Cyprus). 12 The phenomenon of executive dominance in the EU context should not be seen as particularly exceptional or sui generis in comparative terms. Rather it can be understood as part of a much wider phenomenon of the migration of executive power towards types of decision-making that eschew forms of electoral accountability and popular democratic control in a context where there is 'less party on the ground'. 13 Peter Mair's work shows how the very rationale behind the EU, long before the economic crisis, conforms closely to more general thinking about the role and the drawbacks of popular democracy. He analysed the EU as a deliberate construction by national executives as 'a protected sphere' in which policy making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy at the national level. 14 This democratic gap is fed by far-going secrecy arrangements and practices exercised in a concerted fashion by the various executive actors at different levels of governance and resulting in the 'blacking out' of crucial information and documents -even for parliaments. 15 Unilateral executive control over whatever information the executive chooses to consider sensitive disconnects part of the essential machinery of This article is premised on an understanding of democracy that is representative in nature but informed by deliberation and publicity. 17 Its focus is on the role of parliaments (and only incidentally of courts) in operationalising mechanisms of executive accountability that are tailored to the evolving practices of executive actors in complex multi level governance systems. It leaves to one side for now the debate on the desirability and reality of more 'participatory' democracy in the EU context, important though this is as a complement. 18 Beyond a deconstruction exercise on the nature and location of EU executive power, I seek to focus on the challenges facing the democratic actors, (national) parliaments in particular. 19 This should not be confused with a search for a parliamentary democracy at the European level as such. It is not. Rather my overarching goal here is to make a contribution to (incomplete) reconstruction, contributing to a larger and continuing conversation about the necessarily pro-active and networked role of parliaments (both the national parliaments and the European Parliament) in order to provide democratically legitimate countervailing power to an executive power in Europe that migrates and expands in an often accelerated manner, in particular over the course of the past decade or so.
EU executive power: ever deeper and wider?

Fragmented EU government(s)
The European Economic Community as it was originally known embodied a special form of international relations among the governments of the Member States, bounded by the rule of law. Executive power was never meant to reside at the European level. 20 The Commission was the original public administration with clearly defined tasks and functions. 21 Most prominently the Commission exercised supranational executive power in imposing sanctions on companies for infringement of the Treaty competition rules as well as having a policy leadership role. There are in addition well over 40 agencies at the EU level that exercise an expert driven or technocratic executive power, also operationally at times. 22 This has included the creation of more quasi-autonomous 'satellites' (agencies and novel entities such as the European External Action Service) with their own distinct roles and functions, especially in the field of foreign policy and economic policy. If anything the 'agencification' process has deepened and intensified as a result of the response to the economic crisis in the EU -a phenomenon which is considered more specifically elsewhere. 23 Executive power has long been the 'residual', hard to define and rarely attempted, category and as exercised within the EU political system it is clearly not unitary. 24 It consists of supranational institutions and the governments and civil servants of the Member States (with the input of 'experts'). The two most important 20 where civil servants operate in largely invisible supporting roles. 27 Executive actors and administrative constellations transgress levels of governance and national borders in a manner that challenges the coherence of national governments in an unprecedented way. The result is an increasingly compound and accumulated 'order' of executive power in contemporary Europe. 28 The chameleonic and variegated nature and function of the executive at the European level, with the supranational intertwined with the national, has a habit of popping up often in an unpredictable and novel manner in evolving legal and institutional practices. 29 It also evolves and changes -unpredictably-over time. Thus, executive power within the Council of Ministers has migrated away from it in recent years as a result of the shift of some sensitive and operational policy areas either to the Commission in the case of police and judicial cooperation 30 One of the key characteristics of the practice of executive type power by various institutions and actors as it has emerged over the past decades in particular is its fragmentation. 32 To state the obvious: there is no single, comprehensive and unitary European executive institution or body that can in any meaningful way be described as an EU government in the sense that we know it from the national domain. The fragmentation is both at the political level of executive power and also in terms of the administrative apparatus. 33 At the same time if one shift is reinforced by the EU's reaction to the economic crisis in particular it is the shift that has taken place from a more normative or rule-making type of governance to one clearly and explicitly exercising hands on executive power even in such sensitive policy fields as national budgets and macro-economic decisions. Crisis management by the European Council in particular has shifted from 'economic governance' in the sense of a rules-based normative system to 'economic government' entailing discretionary executive decisions. 34 All the 'governance' literature and analysis of recent years notwithstanding, 35 'government' in a non-unitary sense is also part of what must be studied and understood in the context of the evolving political system of the EU. In this line two main actors are the focus of more detailed attention: the European Council in the lead and the Council where the (national) executive power legislates and supranational executive power is also exercised.
The European Council leads and constructs (also extramurally)
The 'ever mighty' European Council is authoritatively considered as the toplevel 'leader' of the European Union as such. 36 It has seen its executive powers consolidated and even expanded in processes of incremental institutionalization, first in layers of legal and institutional practices and more recently in formal Treaty provisions after the Lisbon Treaty. It was already for a long time the motor behind 32 See, B. Crum, 'Executive Accountability in the European Union ' (2013) many important steps in the European integration process, particularly those at its outer edges, such as initially justice and home affairs, foreign and defence policy and most recently the EU reactions to the economic and financial crisis. 37 With the Lisbon Treaty it formally became an institution of the Union subject to its rules, rather than floating outside it and its powers were explicitly stated to be non-legislative, defining the 'general political directions and priorities'. 38 The European Council has gradually developed into a very significant agenda setter of the larger developments of the EU, in spite of the Commission's monopoly of legislative initiative. 39 44 These tasks belonged in the past to the Commission but the Commission has seen its position progressively weakened over the years as bit-by-bit the role of legislative initiator and de facto supervisor of implementation have been assumed to some extent in practice by the European Council. 45 The professionalization of the support of the European Council has meant that it has been able to increase greatly the frequency with which it meets, over and above the four a year prescribed in Article 15 (3) TFEU. Thus, in 2011 no less than six European Council summit meetings took place including one 'informal' one. 46 49 This illustrates the more general conundrum of the 17-member euro-zone relying on the 28-member EU institutions, which produces a strong discrepancy between the problem structure and the supporting decision-making structure. 50 The centrality and sheer leading power of both types of summit meetings are now very visible as a result of the debt crisis measures in particular and this contributes to their empowerment. In addition, the political salience of what is being discussed has led to repercussions at the national level, in particular in debtor states, in the shape of governmental crises and political downfalls. 51 The European Council calls the shots in general terms and largely tells the Commission (and the Council) what to do if formal legislation needs to be adopted. In the early days of the debt crisis for example it seemed as if the Commission would emerge as the institutional winner with it exercising its normal role of initiation on the 'European Semester '. 52 This 'soft' new procedure seeks to coordinate economic and budgetary policies between the EU and member states of the Euro-area. 53 Based on an annual growth survey, the Commission systematically reviews national budget plans and publishes intergovernmental meeting. 61 In that capacity they adopted an executive decision by which they committed themselves to constitute the EFSF outside the EU legal framework and which became immediately operational upon signature by the representatives of the governments without the need to go through ratification by their national parliaments. They established the EFSF as a private company established under Luxembourg law of which the 17-euro states are the only shareholders. By using 'a curious mixture of public international law and private law, a large part of the Council parted company with the Commission and the European Parliament.' 62 At a later stage, the ESM, the permanent successor of the temporary EFSF was created by means of a fully-fledged treaty between the 17-euro member states even though arguably a EU legal instrument could have been used. 63 The ESM was constituted as a separate international organization established under international law rather than as an EU agency. Its legality has been found by the CJEU to be unobjectionable. 64 It appears from the above that it is not just that the European Council as a formal EU institution is taking the really leading decisions -a smaller group within the European Council may change hats and convert itself into another entity with fewer participants if it needs to because of a looming veto or otherwise and adopts decisions outside the EU altogether. It does this largely en marge of a (European) Council meeting. As far as the Council is concerned, the non-euro area Member
States can anyway not vote on euro area issues. The smaller group votes, e.g. by the ESM Board of Governors, are done on the margins of the Eurogroup, not on the margins of the subsequent ECOFIN Council meetings. A variety of clever legal constructions are thus used that are tailor-made to each situation -the view being seemingly taken that there is no alternative. The 'extra-mural' decisions are in any 61 event binding under international law and are subject to some of the constraints of the EU system. If this is the fire brigade of a more politically integrated future EU, it is arguably one that is, like Schengen when it functioned outside of the EU, even more dominated by executives than was the case with the traditional Community method.
The Council of the EU legislates, negotiates and executes
Below the European Council in the (national) executive hierarchy of the EU is the Council -the body originally conceived as the principal decision-making body for European integration. The Council of Ministers, as it was initially known, was designed as the political decision-making centre among the institutions of the Union and its predecessors. 65 It is inter-governmental in conception and composition and has been described as 'a complex and chameleon like beast.' 66 The Council continues to be perceived as mainly a political organ with (both formal and substantive) Council even if consensus remains the main working method in practice. 67 After Lisbon the Council's core role as a legislative body became even more prominent. 68 This legislative power is shared with the European Parliament. Its composition of national ministers and (at the lower levels) national civil servants means that even in a context where the outcome is legislation with direct effect and supremacy, its self-perception is that it remains a forum for intergovernmental negotiations among representatives of the executive power of the Member States. 69 The operating modus of the Council is still today grounded in conventions of diplomacy and hark back to a different era when the precursor of the EU, the EEC, could be considered as embodying a special form of international relations among the governments of the Member States. 70 Legislation was originally adopted in the context of the EU (and its predecessors) by a process of diplomatic negotiations among the Member States in the Council. Diplomats typically embrace secrecy as part of their working method. 71 The Council today remains ambiguous about its 'legislative' preparation and in particular the preparation of its own collective position seeking always to ensure that the individual Member States can 'negotiate' freely in a 'blacked out' space. 72 At the same time the Council is clearly more than an arena for intergovernmental negotiations. It is an institution with an institutional memory and institutional preferences. Institutional memory directly results from the centralization of the administrative functions of an international organization. This includes keeping the records, minutes and archives. 73 As a result the Secretariat also becomes a source of co-ordination, coherence and continuity in the Council's work. 74 The Council General Secretariat developed into its institutional memory and it also functions as a bridge between various chairs. Its officials support not only the Council in all its formations, but also its preparatory bodies such as the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the various working groups. In addition, the hierarchically inferior Council is now 'joined' and linked in concrete terms to the European Council by the Council General Secretariat. Another clear link is the Legal Service of the Council, which given that the European Council does not 69 Naurin, n 26 above. 70 Due to the rotating nature of the Council Presidency, national governments are given the opportunity to influence the political priorities of the EU, and the visibility of the EU is increased due to the involvement of national politicians. The advent and practice of the European Council has however clearly affected the ability of a Council presidency changing hands every 6 months to perform a concerted agenda-setting role that is long-term oriented and aims to find solutions beyond the common denominator. The European Council has, in effect, provided such political leadership in recent years, and not the Council Presidency even with the advent of more supranational team Presidencies in 2007. 76 On the other hand, useful management and organisation tasks are efficiently performed by the rotating Council presidency. In addition, the Council Presidency seeks to find solutions aimed at the common denominator and facilitates wider group processes (which increasingly include negotiating with the European Parliament in co-decision). 77 The introduction of 'political union' in the Treaty of Maastricht twenty years ago changed already in a significant way the nature of the Council and meant that it had to become 'operational' in an executive manner that was not originally envisaged. In many ways its executive type tasks were parallel to those of the Commission but in the newer sensitive policy areas of foreign policy and justice and home affairs. 78 The structures of the Council itself and in particular the Council General Secretariat acquired a powerful role in these years, especially with regard to areas relating to internal security and external security and foreign affairs. 79 85 The steady reinforcement over the years of other 'backstage' actors, such as COREPER provide the backbone that enables the Council to function as an institution, aided and abetted by often very powerful, (quasi-) autonomous committees such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC). 86 Composed of national ambassadors permanently based in Brussels, it has been described as the 'linchpin' of the system of foreign and security policy 87 and as the 'executive board' of the CFSP. 88 Also of considerable importance are the various working groups and working parties. 89 Research suggests that over time these institutions have gained considerable autonomy from the governments they are meant to serve. 90 The national bureaucratic input into Council decision-making starts at the important Working Party level. 91 Here, too, research suggests that national representatives become socialised over time into group norms that may establish a 'we-feeling' among the policy makers. This indicates more generally moves de facto beyond strict 'intergovernmentalism'. 92
Evolving working practices of EU executive actors
Informational asymmetry and the diplomatic paradigm
The democratic deficit of the EU has been discussed for decades. 93 The EP, which will soon be elected by the citizens of the 28 EU Member States, has become a key player in the EU decision-making system. Yet European elections are seen as 'second-order' elections; 94 they are popularity tests for the national incumbent parties rather than opportunities for real public deliberation on European issues. 95 norm. Here too, it may only be through litigation one day that the political actors will be forced to change those of their institutional working practices that undermine fundamental principles of democracy and publicity at the European level.
In a pending court case, Advocate General Cruz Villalón has opined that the entire early legislative procedure before the Council involving the input by the various Member States must be compared to a national legislative procedure. Owing to the characteristics of law making at the EU level the requisite level of democratic legitimacy can only be bestowed by 'a procedure based on the principles that have traditionally governed the workings of national legislatures that are representative in nature.' 113 On this reasoning, democratic accountability requires that the identity of those participating in the debate, and in particular the terms on which they are doing so, be made known. 114 von Rompuy) by fewer documents. 130 The issue of access to the documents of the European Council, if they exist, is underexplored both in relation to the public and in relation to parliaments. The rules of procedure of the European Council specify that the European Council 'may decide' to make public the results of the votes regarding the decisions it adopts, the statements in its minutes and the items relating to the adoption of decisions to make these elements public. 131 The rules on public access to Council documents 'apply mutatis mutandis to European Council documents' but it is specifically stated that the deliberations of the European Council are, as a rule, covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. 132 Given that the Council General Secretariat for now manages the public access provisions for the European Council as well it can be expected that similar rationales for secrecy will prevail in that context.
That is likely to include a heavy reliance on the process rationale for secrecy -that publicity prior to decision-making would hinder the effectiveness and the ability of the (Prime-) Ministers to take decisions. Unlike the Council, the European Council does not produce an Annual Report on how it applies the public access provisions and the numbers of public and non-public documents in its possession. Further empirical work is needed to unveil what exactly the European Council is withholding from public access and its rationale for so doing. Extramurally, it appears that national courts may order release of previously secret documents in the public interest and against the wishes of EU Member States and co-contracting parties. For example, when Finland demanded collateral from Greece in the context of the Greek loan package, Greece insisted on its terms being kept secret. But the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court held that the terms of the Finnish-Greek collateral agreement were a matter of public interest and so they should be made publicly accessible, in their entirety, with the exception of any credentials relating to the co-contracting banks. 133 This shows how national constitutional and administrative rules may force more openness at the European level. When it comes, however, to access by parliaments to information in advance of actual decisionmaking, the picture is quite varied and fragmented and depends on the national constitutional arrangements and the manner in which these have been implemented. This issue of the balance between the need for executive secrecy and the requirement of parliamentary oversight in a democracy will now be addressed more specifically.
Given the dominant paradigm of diplomatic type negotiations including for (quasi-) legislation, what role has representative democracy to play in checking executive dominance both national and supranational? After all, a key challenge for executive accountability in the EU is that there is 'no single, comprehensive and integrated European executive body'. 134 On the contrary, the fact that the EU executive is composed to a significant extent of national governments means that these governments are accountable for implementation through the usual domestic channels, in particular the national parliaments. This does not exclude at the same time a complementary role for the European Parliament as the supranational democratic accountability forum. Yet, have these parliaments -national and European -been hollowed out and blacked out to such an extent that they cannot perform their functions as democratic accountability forums? I will now look at the practices that have evolved in various parliaments, national and European, as a response to some of the challenges outlined above.
Evolving oversight practices of parliaments in Europe
Secrecy obstructs the standard mechanisms for oversight utilised by democracies -elections, public opinion and deliberation. 135 This does not mean that executive actors in a democracy may not legitimately claim secrecy but it will need to be balanced against the citizens' right to information and democratic decisionmaking and oversight. The problem is that since the calculation of harm caused by the disclosure of information cannot be undertaken in public without revealing the very information, this task is delegated to the executive. In most countries the rules on the provision of information allow for 'executive privilege' where the parliament does not need to be directly informed. Sagar compares this to asking the suspect to provide the evidence. 136 'Mediation' promises the benefits of oversight without the potentially adverse consequences of having such oversight conducted in public view. 137 The general mechanism of mediation resolves in theory the conflict between democratic oversight and executive secrecy by having citizens delegate the task of oversight to the judiciary and to the legislature. 138 In the EU context this has meant a role for parliaments in the EU in 'overseeing' the executive in policy making which makes use of both classified information (EUCI) and information which is not classified but is still kept secret (CUI). This exists alongside the more established and, In a representative democracy worthy of its name one of the truly distinctive qualities of parliaments is their publicness, the fact that they constitute a public forum as opposed to an accountability relationship among peers. Public actors performing public activities require publicity for legitimacy. The value of publicity is under challenge also at the European level. Even if we have more widespread involvement of the EP post-Lisbon on legislation, debates have moved more behind closed doors -not less. As a result of the very widespread use in practice of so-called 'trialogue meetings' secret bargaining and negotiations take place among the legislative partners (Council and the EP) up to the moment of the first reading in the EP. 140 Another virtue of parliaments as accountability forums is that they are essentially institutions for deliberation as opposed to private negotiations. But if the executive power denies parliaments, national and European, crucial information by relying on its own internal rules on document security and the effectiveness of its own decision making then the role of parliaments may be eviscerated. The same may happen if parliaments are given access to categories of information (for example, 'limited' documents or those that are classified at lower levels not requiring security clearances) but the executive actors insist that these documents are not made public and are not discussed in public.
(Blacked out) Parliamentary access to information
The right of information of (national) parliaments is of two types. It can be document based and requires that the national parliaments be sent certain documents such as the draft annotated agenda, strategy papers, the government position and a report on the results. Alternatively it can oblige the government (prime minister) to provide explanations in an oral form either to a specialised committee or the plenary. In most countries the rules on the provision of information allow for 'executive privilege' where the parliament does not need to be directly really been forced to justify and defend its EU policies in public -and this has also occurred when the opposition has attacked the cabinet publicly over the handling of EU matters related to the Euro crisis in particular. 144 There is a certain leapfrog effect of 'best practices' discernible among national parliaments and they are on the whole all trying hard to 'catch up' with the new and shifting institutional and policy realities. In the Netherlands for example, since the end of 2010, plenary debates have been scheduled in parliament before European Council summits and this practice has underlined the importance of such summits. It is a big change from the previous situation where plenary sessions were held only after European Council summits. 145 Other issues of high political importance were also debated in the plenary, for example the plans on the emergency fund for the euro-crisis were on the agenda of the plenary throughout the summer of 2011. Yet a recent debate in the Dutch parliament shows that it too is quite unhappy with the level of information it receives in advance of summits. 146 In the United Kingdom the fact that the country has a largely document based system means that the House of Commons simply does not get even the information that is available on time in order to engage in an informed manner with government prior to summit meetings. 147 The European Parliament is in a better position as it can call in representatives of the European Council (and Council) under the conditions these institutions lay down in their own Rules of Procedure. 148 The fact that (as we have seen) the European Council increasingly meets without formal documents hinders the role it can play in 144 Wessels et al at 145 See, M van der Steeg, 'The European Council's Evolving Political Accountability' (2010) advance of decision-making. In addition the President of the European Council has to present a report to the European Parliament after the meetings of the European Council. 149 These -very thin-powers do not lead to meaningful accountability of the European Council by the EP. 150 There are other ways in which a 'leap-frog' effect on parliaments, both European and national, can be discerned. In the Netherlands, the Minister of European Affairs recently granted the Dutch parliament access to 'limited' documents (CUI) after it transpired from a COSAC study 151 that it was one of the few national parliaments not to receive access to these documents. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs admitted that the internal rules of the Council, applied by all EU institutions, took precedence over national rules and meant that the Dutch parliament which has just been granted access to limited documents had to keep the documents 'secret' even though they are not even classified at the very lowest level.
The interest of the State as interpreted by the executive is that parliament cannot discuss publicly unclassified information because of internal Council rules that the government co-adopted at the European level! 152 The implication is that if the trust as defined by the executive institutions in Brussels is breached then legal proceedings also against national parliaments may well follow.
Other future leap-frog effects may come from the adoption of new and cutting-edge laws on access to information and participation by national parliaments that are innovatively tailored to some of the more novel institutional realities now found within the EU political system. For example, in Germany we find an interesting recent example of the Bundestag being prodded by the Federal Constitutional Court to develop better information rights over the Federal Government, in particular in connection with the ESM and the Euro Plus Pact. 153 A little over a year later the Bundestag adopted a law on its participation in matters concerning the EU which included significant information rights. 154 Bundestag delivers an opinion, the Federal Government 'shall use it as a basis for its negotiation.' 160 The Bundestag will be granted access to the documentary databases of the EU 'that are accessible to the Federal Government.' 161 This certainly includes 'limited' documents and 'restricted' documents. In principle it is provided that 'the documents of the EU shall…be transmitted openly.' 162 Yet it is specifically provided that EU security classifications 'shall be respected by the Bundestag' and the reasons for the classification shall be explained on request. 163 The latter obligation to provide the reasons may not be fully possible if the classification has been made by a third party or by an EU institution or agency as it may also not be clear to what extent it is based on derivative sources. 164 As always a lot will depend on how this new law is applied in practice by the various parties (both government and parliament) and on this only time will tell.
Moving from the national parliamentary arena to the supranational, the European Parliament has in fact, already for some years now, been granted some privileged access to EU information. This access was limited to classified information produced and circulated under the auspices of the EU (unless subject to the principle of originator control) and had to be physically consulted on the Councils premises. 165 Early institutional cooperation involved the European Parliament making arrangements to receive and 'handle' sensitive documents as defined in 'secure reading rooms' on the Council's premises as the quid pro quo for being informed on the content of in particular the Council's security and defence policy. 166 A -security cleared 'gang of Five' MEP' s were also given classified briefings, although little public information is available as to how often these measures were availed of in practice nor has -surprisingly -an internal evaluation ever taken place as to how it operated. It was described by one of the MEPs concerned as being like a 'bad Le Carré novel'. 167 In a Framework Agreement made with the Commission in 2009, 168 provision was made to hold committee meetings in camera, attended only by those (select) members of the Bureau and of the EP who satisfied both a 'need to know' requirement and had the appropriate levels of security clearances.
Under the terms of the Framework Agreement the EP agreed to adapt its internal provisions so as to provide for equivalent internal security standards and for the establishment of a specially established oversight committee. In the event, the EP did so in June 2011, after the Council had adopted its new security rules and sought to ensure that its own new security rules would be considered equivalent to those of the Commission and of the Council. The EP is clearly keen to reassure both the Council and the Commission that it is very serious about the measures it has taken to ensure the security of classified and unclassified but sensitive information that it receives from either institution and that it can be 'trusted'. This established inter- The European Parliament is not really showing the way in terms of forcing the executive institutions to be more public in their on-going deliberations. The manner in which the EP has allowed itself to be sucked into the secretive vortex of closed door 'negotiations' on legislation before the first reading in plenary (trialogue meetings) and also accepted Council rules on secrecy in a host of inter-institutional agreements giving it some non public access means that the EP is not engaging with the EU level executive actors in a manner that challenges their domination or that is truly leading. This does not of course mean that the EP is not part of the larger answer as Article 10(2) TEU indicates. It is crucial that the EP continues to engage with the collectivity of executive actors at the supranational level (the European Council, the Euro Summit, the Council, the European Central Bank and Europol) and that it does so alongside its evolving relationship with the Commission.
Something may be changing already when it comes to (some) national parliaments. There is, more and more, a realisation of the need to change both their own working practices as well as their need to network more intensively with their European counterparts (other national parliaments, the European Parliament) in order to address the reality of executive domination at all levels. It is not just a matter anymore of learning from those national parliaments that have a stronger scrutiny position vis a vis their own government in practice (and here the new German law is innovative and seemingly comprehensive in its reach at least on the books) but also of networking more intensively with their own parliamentary counterparts in order to (semi-) collectively be better informed and exert countervailing power, both individually and collectively. This is crucial and is beginning to happen in practice in a variety of ways. It is particularly important to obtain information about the positions of other member state governments that can then be used to enable national parliaments to put together different bits of the puzzle and to begin redressing the informational advantage that all the governments enjoy.
The many recent practices to increase what is termed inter-parliamentary cooperation, among the national parliaments themselves, do attempt to address some aspects of these information asymmetries. 172 The fact that the national parliaments now have representatives in Brussels and that their offices are next to one another provides the possibility of informal but potentially extensive exchanges of information so that when parallel discussions in parliamentary committees and plenaries of the parliaments take place, individual national parliaments are no longer just dependent on the information given by their own government but can rely as well on a more independent sourcing of available information. Of course as comparative research shows, the degree of re-parliamentarisation strongly depends on the broader pattern of executive-legislative relations in different countries. 173 Courts can help by prodding parliaments and executive actors to change their working practices and inter-actions but ultimately it is up to parliaments to assert themselves in a manner that is true to their role in the political system and that is not dictated by government at whatever level.
Although publicity is key to democracy, secrecy is currently the practice. A crucial part of the parliaments' push back against the reality of executive domination is the manner in which they assert their own autonomy over the information in their possession. Do they continue to accept that non classified information that does not breach data protection or privacy rules and purely concerns on-going debates within a variety of EU institutions and committees needs to be kept secret by them even when that means that they cannot perform a vital part of their role as parliaments and public forums for deliberation and debate as a result? The issue of governments (and EU institutions) insisting that they control 'limited' documents (and under EU internal rules these cannot be put into the public domain other than when the document stamp is lifted) and that parliament must abide by these EU procedural 172 Crum and Fossum, n 104 above. gave authority for the matter to be exposed in the House of Commons. It was rather an awkward way of having to do it, but that did happen on that occasion.' 174 It goes without saying that some provision must be made for parliaments to keep (highly) classified secrets but at the European level a public debate is missing on when secrets must be kept and how (a type of EU Secrecy law) -as things stand at present it is a matter of total executive prerogative and internal rule-making that is then applied subsequently also to restrict national parliaments. 175 The shift is from (weak) parliamentary dissatisfaction and (unrealistic) promises that national governments will try and get the EU rules changed that the national governments in Council and European Council themselves adopted (the 
